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Abstract
This paper analyzes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a previously neglected chan-
nel of industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. Using the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a source of exogenous variation in trade
barriers, I show that trade liberalization leads to a signicant increase in M&A activity.
I also provide evidence that resources are transferred from less to more productive rms
in the process and that the magnitude of the overall transfer is quantitatively impor-
tant. Taken together, these results suggest that M&As are an important alternative
to the previously studied adjustment channels of rm and establishment closure and
contraction. This has strong implications for the design of competition policy in the
wake of trade liberalizations since M&As may o¤er a more e¢ cient way of transferring
resources than contraction and closure of low productivity rms combined with internal
growth of more e¢ cient rms.
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1 Introduction
Recent economic research on the e¤ects of trade liberalization has highlighted the importance of
studying the rm- and establishment-level adjustment processes triggered by freer trade (a short
and inexhaustive list of contributions includes Tybout et al., 1991; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995;
Pavcnik, 2002; and Treer, 2004). A central insight from these studies is that a substantial part
of the impact of freer trade works through a reallocation of resources across individual plants and
rms. In particular, the contraction and exit of low productivity establishments and the expansion
of more productive ones can explain a sizeable share of aggregate productivity increases found in
the wake of trade liberalizations (see Pavcnik, 2002; and Treer, 2004).
While this literature has thus demonstrated the general importance of micro-level resource
reallocation in understanding the e¤ects of freer trade, the central issue of how resources are
transferred between individual rms is still not su¢ ciently well understood. In particular, only
scarce attention has been paid to resource transfers through the market for corporate control, i.e.
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This is despite the fact that M&As can, in principle,
play a similar role as the adjustment processes highlighted in the existing literature. Instead of
closing down establishments, reducing output or exiting altogether, rms also have the option to
search for buyers interested in parts or the whole of their operations. Similarly, expanding rms can
buy and integrate other rms rather than expand production at existing plants or open new ones.
Establishment-level studies which focus on plant-level contraction, exit or expansion implicitly
ignore this potential margin of adjustment since they do not look at changes in ownership at
continuing plants.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether M&As do indeed play a role
in industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. This is important for a number of
reasons. First, studying M&As is necessary to obtain a more complete picture of the mechanisms
rms use to adjust to freer trade and the extent of inter-rm resource transfers involved in this
adjustment. Second, M&As are not just another way of transferring resources but are likely to be
qualitatively di¤erent from the other adjustment forms in that they are swifter and potentially more
e¢ cient. Instead of workers and capital becoming unemployed for some period before being rehired,
1Similarly, a smaller group of papers that use rms rather than plants or establishments as their unit of analysis
focus on exit by bankruptcy as the principal form of adjustment and do not consider M&As (see for example Gu
et al., 2003; or Baggs, 2005). Note that throughout this paper, I will use the words "establishment" and "plant"
interchangeably to denote a unit of production within a rm.
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acquisitions allow for an immediate transfer into new ownership. Also, M&As allow the takeover of
entire production structures which may be most e¢ cient if preserved as a whole. Finally, knowing
whether or not M&As play an important role in rm adjustment to freer trade might also shed
new light on results from previous plant-level studies. For example, reallocations of control rights
at existing establishments and ensuing restructuring undertaken by the new management might be
part of the reason for the important within-plant increases in productivity found in many studies
(e.g. Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002).
The particular liberalization episode I will study in this paper is the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. As will be argued in more detail, CUSFTA provides
an ideal setting for the purpose of this study. Most importantly, it represented a clear-cut and
unanticipated policy experiment which was not introduced in response to macroeconomic shocks
nor accompanied by other major economic reforms. Furthermore, the main policy instrument used
(tari¤ reductions) is easily quantiable and shows a large variation across sectors. Finally, the large
size di¤erence between the treaty partners and the implied variation in expected responses to the
integration shock further increases the potential for convincing econometric identication.
Against this background, I will present three main sets of ndings. In a rst step, I examine
whether there is evidence that CUSFTA led to more M&A activity. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach, I nd a substantial increase in the number of domestic Canadian transactions which is
positively correlated with the magnitude of tari¤ cuts across sectors. The impact on domestic U.S.
M&A activity is much smaller and mostly statistically insignicant, consistent with the idea that
CUSFTA presented a bigger shock for the smaller Canadian market. Cross-border transactions
show substantial changes around the implementation of CUSFTA as well, although the link to
tari¤ reductions is less clear cut.
In a second step, I examine rm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers in order to inves-
tigate whether acquisitions involve a transfer of resources from less to more productive rms, as
seems to be the case for the previously studied channels of adjustment (exit and contraction). This
is indeed what I nd: acquirers tend to be bigger, more protable and more productive.
In a nal step, I look at the amount of inter-rm transfers of output and employment in
North America that were due to M&As during my sample period 1985-1998. Comparing results to
resource transfers via exit and contraction, I nd that M&As were quantitatively important relative
to these alternative channels of adjustment. Taken together, these results suggest that M&As are
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an important alternative to the adjustment mechanisms of rm and establishment closure and
contraction that have been emphasized in earlier research.
A number of recent theoretical contributions in the international trade literature have also stud-
ied rm-level reallocation processes triggered by trade liberalization (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al.,
2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007; and Falvey, Greenaway and Yu, 2004). As the empirical
literature on plant- and rm-level adjustment by which they were motivated, however, they do not
examine M&As as a form of resource transfer. Another group of papers in International Trade does
look at M&As but mostly in the form of cross-border transactions and in the context of foreign
direct investment (e.g. Görg, 2000; Horn and Persson, 2001; Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; di Giovanni,
2005). Rather than analyzing M&As as a means of industry restructuring, these authors examine
their role as an alternative form of foreign market access in addition to greeneld investment and
exports. Bertrand and Zitouna (2006) and Neary (2007) present models in which M&As are a
way of restructuring industries after trade liberalization, but they also restrict their analysis to
cross-border mergers. In contrast, several theoretical contributions in industrial organization have
directly focused on M&As as a mechanism for transferring resources between domestic rms. In
particular, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2004) use models with heterogenous rms to show how
M&As can serve as a complement to exit and internal adjustment to rm- and industry-specic
shocks. However, they focus their attention on closed-economy settings and only analyze domestic
shocks.
On the empirical side, contributions in corporate nance and industrial organization have long
pointed out that M&As can play a substantial role in restructuring industries and that their conse-
quences go far beyond a mere change in ownership (e.g. Jensen, 1993; Kaplan, 2000; Copeland et
al., 2003). Moreover, authors like Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) or Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004)
have demonstrated that M&As are indeed frequently used as a means of rm expansion and com-
plement or replace internal investment in that respect. Comparisons of empirical studies also show
that acquisitions perform very similarly to other forms of investment in terms of abnormal stock
market returns (Andrade et al., 2001). On the targets side, takeovers usually bring large abnormal
gains in share prices and most acquired assets show signicant increases in productivity (Maksi-
movic and Phillips, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001). Finally, a number of recent studies have succeeded
in directly linking increases in M&A activity to domestic shocks like deregulation and nancial
innovation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade and Sta¤ord, 2004).
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The question of whether M&As also play a role in the industrial restructuring necessitated by trade
liberalization shocks, however, has not yet been addressed in a rigorous manner. While there is
some descriptive and anecdotal evidence to the a¢ rmative (Chudnovsky, 2000; OECD, 2001), no
clear econometric results have been presented thus far.2 This is the gap the present contribution
tries to ll.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses predictions on the link
between trade liberalization and M&A activity based on insights from existing theoretical work.
Section 3 provides additional background information on CUSFTA and section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 proceeds to the empirical investigation of changes in M&A activity in the wake
of CUSFTA, section 6 compares characteristics of targets and acquirers and section 7 provides
evidence on the quantitative importance of M&As as a form of resource transfer. I conclude with a
summary of ndings, potential implications for economic policy, and directions for future research
(section 8). Formal derivations of the main predictions of section 2 and details on data construction
are contained in two separate appendices.
2 Empirical Predictions
How might trade liberalization lead to an increase in M&A activity? In order to highlight a
potential mechanism, the following discussion combines insights from closed-economy models of
M&A activity (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, 2004) with results from recent heterogenous rm
models in International Trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003). The focus here is on the basic intuition and
empirical predictions. A formal derivation of the main results from a fully specied model is
contained in Appendix A.
The underlying assumption of models of M&A activity, such as the one by Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002), is that all rms possess assets that are of interest to other rms. These can be
specic production skills, marketing capabilities or simply physical capital needed for production.
Changes in demand and supply conditions will lead to changes in rm-specic demand for these
2An earlier study by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and a recent working paper by Greenaway et al. (2005) present
(mixed) evidence on the link between import penetration rates and M&As. However, since there is no exogenous
variation in this measure of exposure to trade, it is not obvious whether their results can be interpreted in favor or
against a link between trade liberalization and M&A activity. For example, any negative productivity shock that
triggers restructuring of a given industry is likely to involve M&As (see Andrade et al., 2001). At the same time,
the decline in the sectors relative productivity as compared to the rest of the world will lead to more imports and
a higher import penetration rate. Such issues are reminiscent of the problems which plagued earlier studies on the
link between trade and mark-ups, rm size or productivity (as discussed in Tybout, 2001, or Fernandes, 2003).
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assets, with expanding rms wanting to increase their stocks and contracting rms looking for
potential buyers. While the necessary transfer of resources can take place via both M&As and
internal investment or divestment, it is straightforward to derive empirically relevant conditions
under which both channels are active in equilibrium.3
Within this framework, the demand shock resulting from bilateral trade liberalizations such as
CUSFTA is easily analyzed. The crucial e¤ect of such liberalizations is their di¤erential impact
across domestic rms with di¤erent levels of productivity (see Melitz, 2003). As a number of
studies have shown, setting up export activities is costly and requires an initial investment (see
Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Thus, only more productive rms that can
a¤ord these setup costs will benet from liberalization through increased exporting opportunities.
Low productivity rms, in contrast, will su¤er lower prots due to more intense product market
competition from foreign rms while at the same time being unable to benet from better access
to the foreign market. Both e¤ects will be stronger the bigger the extent of liberalization, i.e. the
bigger the decrease in variable trade costs such as tari¤s. Thus, while exporters need additional
capital in order to expand operations, non-exporters attach less value to their existing capital stock.
As before, M&As provide a mechanism through which the necessary transfers of assets can take
place. Given that only the most productive rms will be exporters, a direct implication is that
assets are transferred from less to more productive (and protable) rms.
Note that the above is in essence a story about domestic within-sector adjustment to trade
liberalization. While a within-sector analysis will be part of the empirical analysis below, the
data reveal a number of features which require additional considerations. The rst concerns the
substantial size di¤erences between the liberalization partners, with the U.S. market being about
ten times the size of its Canadian counterpart. This suggests that trade liberalization should have
a much stronger e¤ect on M&A activity in Canada since increases in both import competition and
exporting opportunities will be substantially bigger there.
Second, a large share of M&A activity consists of diversifying or conglomerate M&A transactions
that go across industry boundaries. The basic intuition outlined above still applies, however.
Firms want to acquire production capacity in other industries through acquisitions both because of
improved exporting opportunities there or because increased import competition has made assets
3For example, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) assume that M&As require a xed cost investment but (in equilib-
rium) incur lower costs per unit of capital acquired. The resulting prediction, that large expansions take place via
M&As and smaller ones via internal investment, is consistent with empirical results presented by these authors.
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cheaper. Since the targets capital is likely to be sector specic in the vast majority of cases, this
argument also makes clear that the relevant reductions in variable trade costs in such a multi-sector
model are the ones facing the acquisition target. This is because the acquirer will have to use the
new production capacity to produce the target industrys goods.
Finally, acquisitions also take place across national borders. For example, expanding foreign
exporters may want to acquire import competing domestic rms in addition to non-exporters in their
own home market. A growing body of theoretical research suggests that additional considerations
come into play for this category (see Bertrand and Zitouna, 2006; Bjornvatn, 2004) As before,
the decrease in the domestic rmsasset reservation price will encourage acquisitions. However,
there will now also be a counterbalancing e¤ect for horizontal M&As arising from tari¤-jumping
considerations: decreases in variable trade costs make it easier to serve the foreign market via
exports and reduce the incentives to establish production capacity there via acquisitions. The
overall e¤ect of trade liberalization on M&A activity is thus not clear cut.
To summarize, the above discussion suggests addressing the following questions in the empirical
analysis:
1. Do reductions in variable trade costs (tari¤ cuts) lead to more takeovers of rms in the a¤ected
sectors? Is this e¤ect stronger in industries with larger tari¤ reductions?
2. Is the e¤ect similar for within- and cross-industry acquisitions? Is it similar for domestic and
cross-border transactions?
3. Is there a stronger impact on the M&A activity in the smaller Canadian market?
4. Are acquirers more productive and protable than targets? Again, does this di¤erence vary
across the di¤erent M&A categories (within- vs. between-industry and domestic- vs. cross-
border)?
Answers to these questions will shed light on the qualitative characteristics of M&As as an
adjustment mechanism in the face of trade liberalization. A further interesting question that arises
is whether resource transfers via M&As are also quantitatively important. While the nature of my
dataset does not allow a denitive answer to this question, I will provide some evidence that the
overall amount of transfers is indeed likely to be large (section 7).
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3 The Case of CUSFTA
The particular liberalization episode I use for my empirical investigation is the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreements (CUSFTA) of 1989. The idea of abolishing trade barriers between
Canada and the U.S. had been around for some time before CUSFTA but strong opposition in
Canada had led to the eventual failure of all prior attempts at implementing free trade. Against this
background and again against substantial political opposition, negotiations for CUSFTA started in
May 1986, were nalized in October 1987 and the treaty was signed in early 1988. The agreement
came into e¤ect on 1 January 1989 which was also the date of the rst round of tari¤ cuts. Tari¤s
were then phased out over a period of up to ten years with some industries eventually opting for a
swifter phase-out.
In terms of economic analysis, CUSFTA presents several advantages over other trade liberal-
izations. First, the main instrument of liberalization - tari¤ cuts - is easily quantiable and shows
a large variation across sectors which allows for the implementation of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation strategy. Secondly, CUSFTA was a clearly dened policy experiment in the sense that it
was neither part of a larger packet of market reforms nor was it introduced in response to a macro-
economic shock, two factors that have made the identication of trade reform e¤ects extremely
di¢ cult in other settings (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Treer, 2004). In this sense, the reductions
in tari¤ rates triggered by CUSFTA can to a large extent be regarded as exogenous - indeed, Treer
(2004) performs formal statistical tests for a wide range of specications and dependent variables
but nds little evidence to the contrary.
In the context of studying the impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity, CUSFTA has
two additional advantages. First, its ratication by the Canadian parliament was uncertain as
late as November 1988.4 The fact that CUSFTAs eventual implementation was thus far from
being a foregone conclusion reduces concerns about anticipatory M&A activity and makes the
years before 1989 a suitable control period. In addition, CUSFTA was a liberalization agreement
4See Brander (1991) and Morck et al. (1998) for a chronology of the events leading up to the eventual ratication
of CUSFTA. During the entire process, ratication was considered uncertain given both the prior history of failed
attempts to negotiate free trade with the U.S. and the strength of the opposition to CUSFTA in Canada. This
opposition involved strong factions within the oppositional Liberal Democrats, the New Democratic Party as well as
various organizations and trade unions. Indeed, the Liberal Democratsleader, John Turner, publicly vowed as late
as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of victory in national elections scheduled for 21 November
1988. Opinion polls during the month leading up to the elections certainly suggested that a victory for his party was
a distinct possibility (the high point for the Liberal Democrats was a predicted 10% lead in a Gallup poll of November
7). However, the Canadian Conservative Party party succeeded in reversing public opinion in the nal weeks before
the election and the government was returned with a parliamentary majority su¢ cient to ratify CUSFTA.
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between industrialized countries with developed nancial markets and few restrictions on mergers
and acquisitions, at least in comparison to most other developing and developed countries. Indeed,
although there exists, to my knowledge, no econometric evidence to date, there is some anecdotal
evidence that CUSFTA has led to an increase in M&A activity (OECD, 2001). Given that a number
of existing studies have shown that there has also been a substantial impact on economic variables
other than M&A activity (e.g. Treer, 2004, on productivity and employment; or Head and Ries,
1999, on plant scale and number of plants), it does thus not seem unreasonable a priori to expect
an e¤ect of CUSFTA on the acquisition behavior of rms.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In line with existing studies, my empirical analysis of CUSFTAs impact on M&A activity focuses
on the manufacturing sector which still represents the bulk of tradable goods in an economy and is
thus the sector most directly a¤ected by trade liberalization. The start data of the analysis is 1985,
the date from which onward I have data on M&A activity and rm-level characteristics of targets
and acquirers. For most of the analysis I focus on the period up to 1998, the year in which the last
round of tari¤ reductions took place. Section 5.3, however, also considers the post-implementation
period 1999-2003 as a further robustness check.
Tari¤s and M&A Activity. I use annual three-digit U.S. and Canadian tari¤ data (140
industries) as my measure of the extent of trade liberalization.5 While CUSFTA also included
provisions on non-tari¤ barriers, reductions of tari¤s were the main instrument of liberalization.
As has been pointed out among others by Treer (2004) and Topalova (2004), tari¤ cuts also have
the advantage of being a direct policy instrument and are as such less susceptible to endogeneity
problems. This is in contrast to other more indirect measures like import penetration rates which
are the result of a complex interaction process with a large number of additional factors.6
Data on M&A activity in the manufacturing sector comes from Thomson Financials Worldwide
M&A database. The principal sources of information used by Thomson are over 200 English and
5The data are the same as those described in Head and Ries (1999). I would like to thank Keith Head for making
them available to me. Appendix B.1 provides some additional details on their construction.
6Compare footnote 2 and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a more general discussion of the pitfalls of various
other indirect measures. Of course, tari¤ rates are at the discretion of policy makers and as such subject to di¤erent
endogeneity problems. However, as argued in the previous section, such concerns have less weight in the case of
CUSFTA where tari¤ cuts were unexpected and largely exogenous (at least once one controls for the variation in
initial tari¤ levels - as I will do by using industry xed e¤ect, see below).
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foreign language news sources, SEC lings and their international counterparts, trade publications
and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law rms and other advisors. The database includes
all corporate transactions involving at least 5% ownership of a company and a transaction value of
one million U.S. dollars or more or where the value of the transaction is undisclosed. In line with the
discussion in the previous sections, I use all M&A deals involving acquisitions of U.S. or Canadian
manufacturing targets by other U.S. or Canadian rms, yielding approximately 26,000 transactions
in the main period under study (1985-1998). I dene "M&As" broadly to include sales of individual
business segments and divisions as well as of entire companies. This is consistent with the idea
from the discussion in section 2 that M&As can both be a form of contraction and total rm exit.
For most of the analysis, I exclude acquisitions of minority interests from my sample and focus on
transactions that raise the acquirers share above 50%.7 Transactions are classied into three-digit
industries and matched with the tari¤ data according to the primary activity of the target company
or the acquired business segment (see Appendix B.1 for details). For the main part of this paper, I
will use the number of mergers and acquisitions in a given period as my principal indicator for M&A
activity. Using numbers rather then aggregate deal volumes has two principal advantages. First, it
is the much more readily available indicator since for the majority of deals, transaction values are
not published (this is the case for 55% of deals in my dataset). Second, value measures are extremely
sensitive to the treatment of very large deals which often make up signicant proportions of the
total deal volume despite representing only a few out of several thousand transactions every year.8
However, since count data might overestimate the importance of smaller transactions, section 5.3
also presents some results for transaction values which address the problems posed by missing data
and outliers in di¤erent ways.
Tables 1 and 2 provide some descriptive statistics on M&A activity and manufacturing tari¤s
in North America over the period 1985-1998. I start with an analysis of target rms. The rst four
columns of table 1 show the number of M&A transactions in the U.S. and Canada at the two-digit
level of the U.S. Industrial Classication of 1987. As seen, domestic M&A activity (columns 1 and
7There is some evidence that the threshold for e¤ective control lies below 50%. For example, Morck et al.
(1998) cite evidence that the threshold for e¤ective control lies on average at about 20% in the U.S. Similarly, the
Canadian Competition Bureau (2002) considers all acquisitions of more than 10% of control rights as potentially
anti-competitive, with the corresponding gure for the U.S. being 15% (Brealey and Myers, 2000, chapter 33). In any
case, minority acquisitions comprise only about 15% of the transactions in my sample. See section 5.3 for robustness
checks which include this category.
8 In my sample, for instance, the three biggest deals on average make up about 20% of the aggregate deal volume
in a given year. Within three-digit industries (the aggregation level of my empirical analysis), the biggest transaction
alone accounts on average for over 30% of the entire industry volume during 1985-1998.
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4) is more common than cross-border transactions (columns 2 and 3), even for the smaller Canadian
market. Looking across industries, it becomes apparent that there is substantial variation in the
number of deals. One simple reason for this is that di¤erent industries have very di¤erent numbers
of rms and establishments and thus more or less potential for takeovers. Sectors with more
players usually also have lower concentration ratios and face less scrutiny by antitrust authorities.
Columns 5-6 which list the average number of establishments per industry conrm these conjectures:
industries with more establishments have more M&A activity - the correlation coe¢ cient between
the number of establishments and total M&A transactions is +53% for the U.S. and +65% for
Canada.9 More subtly, there also seems to be a connection between M&A activity and initial tari¤
rates (columns 7-8): industries with higher import tari¤s in 1988 also experience less takeovers
during the entire period 1985-1998 (the correlation coe¢ cient is -32% for the U.S. and -48% for
Canada). This seems in part to be a direct consequence of the relation between M&A activity and
the number of establishments: highly protected industries are usually industries in decline which
already have experienced shakeouts and have relatively few remaining players.
The next question is who the buyers of U.S. and Canadian manufacturing rms are. Table 2
provides some information on this by listing the principal eld of activity of acquiring rms. As
the gures show, slightly more than 60% of acquirers are also manufacturing rms, both in the
U.S. and in Canada. Moreover, about a third of all transactions occur within the same three-digit
sector and another 11% within the same two-digit sector, so that within-industry resource tranfers
via M&As seem to be an important phenomenon. Around 17% of acquirers of U.S.-rms (22% for
Canada) have their principal eld of activity outside manufacturing (SIC-codes 2-3) although this
gure probably overestimates the incidence of diversifying or conglomerate M&As. This is since
about one quarter of non-manufacturing acquirers actually possess secondary elds of activity in
manufacturing, with the gure being as high as 57% in some categories (see columns 3 and 7).10
The second to last line of table 2 lists a category of acquirers that deserves special attention.
The group Investors, n.e.c.(SIC 6799) represents an amalgamation of di¤erent types of acquirers
9The sources for the number of establishments are the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada. I use the
number of establishments rather than the number of rms since my denition of M&As includes both acquisition of
entire rms and of individual subdivisions and possibly plants.
10Looking at secondary elds of activity also increases the numbers of transactions that are potentially of within-
industry nature. Columns 4 and 8 show the fraction of acquirers that have at least one manufacturing 3-digit SIC code
that matches the primary or any secondary manufacturing SIC code of the target. If one counts all these transactions
as intra-industry, the share of this reallocation type rises to 35% (38% for Canada) which represents only a modest
increase of about four percentage points. Since this is clearly an upper bound, classication according to primary
elds of activity seems to be a good approximation in determining the within- or between-industry nature of M&As.
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that are not easily classiable elsewhere. The main subgroups of SIC 6799 are private equity and
venture capital rms, investor groups, and individual investors. In all cases, it seems likely that
acquisitions by these groups represent a signicant reallocation of resources in the sense that targets
will be exposed to substantial restructuring and changes in management practices. Also, among
investor groups, alliances of di¤erent manufacturing rms are not uncommon so that part of SIC
6799 are indeed within-manufacturing acquisitions. For these reasons, I keep transactions involving
SIC 6799 as part of my sample but also present robustness checks excluding this category.
Target and Acquirer Characteristics. For the comparison of target and acquirer char-
acteristics in section 6, I match the transaction parties from the Thomson M&A database to
Compustat North America and Compustat Global using the CUSIP identier common to both
datasets. Thomson Financial itself also provides nancial data on a small number of targets and
acquirers which I use to complement the information from Compustat.
Note that the use of Compustat implies that the sample for comparing target and acquirer
characteristics consists mainly of publicly traded rms (although around 5% of rms are privately
held due to the additional use of data from Thomson Financial). This is in contrast to the full
sample of transaction parties used in section 5 for analyzing changes in M&A activity which also
includes private companies and subsidiaries. However, I believe that this does not pose major
problems for the analysis. First, publicly traded rms make up a substantial fraction of the full
sample (about 35%, with private companies and rm subsidiaries making up the remaining 65% in
the Thomson M&A database). Second, as I will show in the next section, the impact of CUSFTA
on publicly traded rms was if anything slightly stronger than for the full sample of rms. Third,
although the number of publicly traded rms is small relative to the overall number of companies in
Canada and the U.S., their overall share of output and employment is above 80%.11 Thus, even if
target-acquirer di¤erences for non-publicly traded rms were very di¤erent, the ndings presented
in section 6 would still have strong economic relevance.
My indicators of rm performance taken from Compustat and Thomson are measures of pretax
income, stock market returns and total factor productivity. I also look at net sales to give an
impression of the size di¤erences between targets and acquirers. These measures are available for
between 8,500 to 14,500 out of the 52,000 company-year combinations in my data (some companies
11This gure is based on a comparison of aggregate production and employment in Compustat North America and
Compustat Global with comparable data from the UNIDO database.
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are involved in several transactions in the sample period).12
Quantitative Importance of M&As: For the comparison of the amount of rm-level
resource transfers through M&As, contraction and exit (section 7), I will again rely on information
for publicly traded rms from Compustat Global and Compustat North America. In addition
to data on output (net sales) and employment, I use information on the reason for deletion of
companies from the Compustat les to identify rms which exit through M&A, bankruptcy or
liquidation (see appendix B.2 for details). I include all manufacturing rms listed as active in
either Compustat North America or Compustat Global at some point during the period 1985-1998.
After dropping some smaller Canadian rms for which no exit information is available, this yields
a sample of 363 Canadian and 6584 U.S. rms which again represent over 80% of manufacturing
output and employment in North America.
5 Trade Liberalization and M&A Activity
5.1 Graphic Analysis
How has M&A activity in North America evolved over time and what was the impact of CUSFTA?
Figure 1 plots the number of yearly manufacturing M&A transactions over the period 1985-1998
for four di¤erent categories, all expressed as indices relative to 1988: domestic U.S. transactions,
domestic Canadian transactions, acquisitions of U.S. rms by Canadian rms and acquisitions of
Canadian rms by U.S. rms. The graphs also indicate the start date of CUSFTA (1 January 1989)
by a vertical line and have linear splines tted to the data points pre- and post CUSFTA.
The gures do not reveal any clear e¤ect for both U.S. domestic M&A activity and Canada-U.S.
takeovers. Takeovers of Canadian rms, however, both by other Canadian and U.S. rms, show a
marked increase in 1989, the rst year after the implementation of CUSFTA. At the same time, all
graphs display a general strong upward trend in the number of M&A deals over the entire period.
This points to a common problem of descriptive studies that comment on M&A activity in the wake
of CUSFTA (such as OECD, 2001): the strong increases in transactions in the 1990s might simply
reect an underlying long-run trend. The before-after comparisons undertaken here do not have
this problem although it could still be that changes around 1989 were due to other economy-wide
12See appendix B.1 for details on data sources. The relatively low data availability results from the fact that
Compustat only includes publicly traded rms which make up around 35% of all transaction parties in my sample
(compare the earlier discussion).
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factors contemporaneous to the rst round of tari¤ cuts (for example, CUSFTA also contained a
general liberalization agreement on cross-border capital ows).
To provide stronger evidence that the observed changes in M&A activity are indeed due to the
tari¤ cuts implemented through CUSFTA, I split transactions within each of the four categories
into two groups (gure 2). Those from the 50% of target industries that faced the steepest tari¤
cuts and those from the remaining 50%. I choose tari¤s levied by the targets country for this
classication. In practice, U.S. and Canadian tari¤ reductions are very highly correlated so that
results are similar when using the other tari¤ measure. From these gures, a slightly di¤erent
picture emerges. For the two domestic categories, the index of M&A activity is very similar across
the two groups in the pre-CUSFTA period. From 1989 onwards, however, M&A activity in Canada
increases by substantially more in the most a¤ected group. For the U.S., there is also a slightly
more pronounced increase for this group although the di¤erence to the least a¤ected group is much
smaller than in Canada. The impression from the initial graphs thus holds up to this di¤erence-
in-di¤erences analysis. M&A activity in Canada rose sharply after 1989 and the magnitude of this
increase is related to the extent of tari¤ cuts across sectors. The impact on the U.S. is much smaller,
consistent with the notion that the liberalization shock was substantially bigger in Canada which
integrated with a market ten times her own size.
Turning to the cross-border categories (the two right hand side panels), the picture is less clear.
The lines for both most and least a¤ected industries move relatively closely together over the whole
period. One potential explanation for this is that tari¤-jumping motives as an additional determi-
nant for horizontal cross-border M&A transactions are at work here. That is, in industries with
stronger tari¤ reductions, U.S. (Canadian) rms were less dependent on acquiring local production
capacity to serve the Canadian (U.S.) market. Instead, they could serve the foreign market directly
through exports. This additional factor might have helped to o¤set the increased incentives for
acquisitions working through decreases in the domestic rmsasset reservation prices (compare the
discussion in section 2 on this point).
5.2 Econometric Specication and Baseline Results
This section evaluates whether the impressions from the graphs of the last section carry over to a
formal econometric analysis. Among other things, the results obtained so far have drawn attention
to two potential pitfalls such an analysis faces. First, M&A activity shows strong inter-industry
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variation and is negatively related to initial tari¤ levels (see section 4). Since all tari¤s were
eventually eliminated under CUSFTA, higher initial levels also meant stronger subsequent cuts,
implying a potentially spurious correlation of tari¤ changes and M&A activity. Second, the strong
increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions over the whole period 1985-1998 suggests the
presence of a general economy-wide trend in M&A activity. Since all tari¤s came down after
1989 this could again lead to a spurious correlation with tari¤ cuts. To address these issues, I
will implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach by controlling for both industry and time xed
e¤ects.
As discussed, my indicator for M&A activity will be the number of transactions in a given time
period and industry (denoted MAit henceforth). The prevalence of small integer values and zeros
suggests the use of count data models for the estimation. In order to smooth the data and reduce
the number of zero observations, I aggregate numbers over the pre- and post CUSFTA-period (1985-
1988 and 1989-1998). This yields a panel with two time periods and 140 industries. For measuring
the extent of trade liberalization, I use the absolute change in tari¤ levels from the year prior to
CUSFTA (1988) to the last year of tari¤ reductions (1998). Because CUSFTA was a bilateral
liberalization agreement and the treaty partners tended to protect the same sectors, the magnitude
of U.S. and Canadian tari¤ cuts is very similar across industries. In line with previous empirical
studies of trade liberalizations - which mostly look at unilateral tari¤ reductions by a particular
country - I opt for domestic tari¤s. That is, I use Canadian tari¤ cuts when analyzing the impact
of CUSFTA on takeovers of Canadian rms and U.S. tari¤s cuts for transactions involving U.S.
targets.13 Thus, my initial count data specication is given by:
E(MAitjdt; di; dpre; dpost) = it = exp (di + dpre + dpost +   dpost  dti) (1)
where di are industry xed e¤ects, dpre and dpost are time xed e¤ects denoting the pre- and
post-CUSFTA period, and dti is the absolute change in tari¤s from 1988 to 1998. Since all tari¤s
decreased after 1988, we have dti = tari¤1988  tari¤1998  0. Note that measuring tari¤ reductions
in this way implies that  is positive if trade liberalization leads to increases in M&A activity.14
13Robustness checks using foreign tari¤ reductions as regressors yielded similar results which is unsurprising given
the very high correlation of tari¤ cuts (in excess of 85%). An interesting area for future work would be to study more
asymmetric liberalization agreements with su¢ cient independent variation in tari¤ cuts. Such agreements would
allow to separately identify the e¤ects of import- and export-promoting policies on M&A activity.
14Alternativley, one could use the (absolute) level of tari¤ cuts in the pre- and post-CUSFTA period in specication
(1). However, this approach yielded a number of problems for the subsequent analysis. First, the binary tari¤ cut
measure introduced in the next subsection shows little variation pre and post CUSFTA. Second, using per-period
15
The identifying assumption I will initially make (but later relax) is that all other determinants
of M&A activity besides tari¤ cuts are either time or industry invariant (and as such controlled
for by my industry and time xed e¤ects) or uncorrelated with tari¤ cuts. Under this assumption,
consistent estimates of the parameters in (1) can be obtained via xed e¤ects Poisson estimation.
I opt for Poisson rather than a negative binomial model since the former has the desirable ro-
bustness property that consistency of estimates will be achieved as long as the conditional mean
(1) is correctly specied - irrespective of whether MAit actually follows a Poisson distribution (see
Wooldridge, 1999 and 2002; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Standard errors will be a¤ected by
deviations from the Poisson assumption but computation of variance-covariance matrices robust
to overdispersion, heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation is straightforward (Wooldridge,
1999 and 2002).
Table 3 reports results for my baseline Poisson xed e¤ects model (1) for the full sample of
acquirers, i.e. manufacturing rms from the same three-digit sector as the target, manufacturing
rms from other sectors and rms with principal activities outside manufacturing. Columns 1-4
show coe¢ cient estimates of  and dpost for each of the four subgroups of M&As (domestic and
cross-border transactions).15 As seen, the strongest impact of CUSFTA seems to be on domestic
Canadian M&A activity which is consistent with the earlier graphical analysis. The coe¢ cient
estimates indicate that every percentage point decrease in tari¤s increased the number of takeovers
of rms in the a¤ected industries by on average 11.1%. Given that the mean decline in Canadian
tari¤s at the three-digit level was about 7%, this suggests that CUSFTA increased M&A activity
by approximately 78%. The corresponding coe¢ cient for the U.S. is actually slightly negative but
far from statistically signicant (the t-statistic is only 0.60). This again highlights the di¤erential
impact of CUSFTA on the two markets. For the two cross-border categories, coe¢ cient estimates
are insignicant as well which again conrms the impressions from the earlier graphic analysis.
tari¤ cuts is problematic when looking at several post-CUSFTA periods (as parts of section 5.3 do). This is because
once ratication was certain, the time structure of the impact of tari¤ cuts is less clear (i.e. do future, present or
past tari¤ cuts matter for M&A activity?). In any case, tari¤ changes in 1985-1988 were very small both in absolute
terms and compared to the subsequent cuts. Thus, assuming a zero-change - as is implicitly done in specication
(1) - seems to be a good approximation. See appendix B.1 for a brief discussion of the very similar results obtained
when using tari¤ reductions pre and post CUSFTA
15dpre is the excluded category so that dpost gives the average relative increase of M&A activity in comparison to
the pre-CUSFTA period that is not explained by tari¤ cuts.
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5.3 Robustness Checks
Control Variables As a rst robustness check, I introduce European Union M&A activity in the
same period as an additional regressor. This will help controlling for time- and industry-varying
M&A determinants besides tari¤ cuts which would not have been picked up by the xed e¤ects in
my rst specication. More specically, I use the number of domestic M&As in the UK, France
and (West) Germany as the control for the two regressions on domestic M&A activity and the
number of all cross-border M&As with targets in one of these three countries as the control for the
cross-border categories (excluding acquisitions by U.S. or Canadian rms).16
The idea behind this approach is that these countries were largely una¤ected by CUSFTA and
changes in takeover activity there should thus pick up any general industry-level trends in underlying
M&A determinants. Since many factors which might potentially inuence takeover rates are highly
correlated across developed countries, these trends are likely to be similar in Europe and in North
America. Examples include oil price shocks, low sales growth and low capacity utilization combined
with large amounts of free cash ow in declining industries, or strongly increasing price-earnings
ratios in times of stock market bubbles. Indeed, the simple correlation between the number of
European and U.S. or Canadian M&A transactions per-period and industry is on average about
70%.17
Columns 4-6 of table 3 show the results for my initial specication with the controls in place.
As seen, the coe¢ cient estimates are very similar to the earlier results, consistent with the idea
that industry and time xed e¤ects already captured most of the inuence of non-tari¤ related
determinants of M&A activity.
Di¤erent Functional Forms I next examine the e¤ect of using di¤erent functional forms for
my tari¤ reduction variable. The rst alternative measure uses the log of the absolute tari¤ change,
i.e. dti = log(tari¤1988 tari¤1998) rather than dti = tari¤1988 tari¤1998.18 The second measure is a
16The UK, France and (West) Germany are the three developed countries besides Canada and the U.S. for which
M&A coverage in Thomson Financial is reasonably complete back to 1985.
17Note that it would be inappropriate to directly include industry-level variables like output, employment, the num-
ber of rms, capacity utilization or productivity growth as additional controls. Besides likely endogeneity problems,
the common concern with these variables is that there is ample evidence that they are themselves strongly inuenced
by tari¤ reductions (see Treer, 2004, and Head and Ries, 1999). I have however experimented with business cycle
controls as in Treer (2004). That is, I ran sector-level regressions of M&A activity on present and past business cycle
conditions (GDP growth, real exchange rates) and used the predicted values as additional controls in my regressions.
While these predicted values have themselves strong explanatory power, their correlation with tari¤ reductions is low
and their inclusion does not a¤ect any of the conclusions presented here (results available from the author).
18A log specication is indeed what one obtains from a fully specied model of M&A activity and trade liberalization
(see Appendix A). I focus on the absolute tari¤ change in the following since results from this approach are more
17
binary indicator taking the value one if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest
tari¤ cuts, i.e. dti = 1(jdtitj > dt50%). This measure is thus similar to the one used in the graphic
analysis from the last section.
Table 4 show the corresponding results which yield a qualitatively similar picture to the baseline
estimates. Again, the strongest and most signicant e¤ect of CUSFTA is on domestic Canadian
M&A activity. The impact on U.S.-by-U.S. acquisitions is marginally signicant for the binary
indicator but magnitudes are again much smaller. Estimates for the cross-border acquisitions
remain insignicant as before.
Results for Di¤erent Subsamples I perform further robustness checks by looking at specic
subsamples of M&A transactions (see table 5). I start by excluding the acquirer SIC-code 6799
("Investors, n.e.c."). As discussed earlier, a large fraction of this category is made up by private
equity and venture capital rms as well as private investors, groups which do not neatly t into the
earlier theoretical framework. Next, I include acquisitions of minority interests in my sample, i.e.
transactions at the end of which the acquirer holds less than 50% of control rights or held more than
50% to begin with. Block 3 of table 5 only uses M&A transactions taking place within identical
three-digit manufacturing industries. A comparison with results for the full sample will shed some
light on the relative importance of cross- vs. within-industry acquisitions discussed in section 2.
Finally, block 4 of table 5 restricts the sample to transactions involving publicly traded rms. This
is of interest since the following sections, which look at target and acquirer characteristics and the
quantitative importance of M&As as a form of reallocation, will almost exclusively rely on data for
publicly traded rms. It is thus useful to check whether the qualitative results found so far also
apply to this particular subsample of rms. In addition, publicly traded rms tend to be bigger
and are more likely to be exporters which suggests that CUSFTAs impact may indeed have been
di¤erent for this group.
As is evident from table 5, the main conclusions from the previous sections are una¤ected by
changes in sample composition. The impact of tari¤ cuts on domestic Canadian M&A activity
is always positive and statistically signicant and the coe¢ cient magnitudes remain close to the
baseline specication. If anything, the impact seems to be larger for publicly traded rms (a 15.5%
increase in M&A activity per percentage point tari¤ cut compared to 11.1% above). Estimates for
easily interpreted. The qualitative results of the following robustness checks hold equally for both log changes and
the binary indicator (results available from the author upon request).
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the other M&A categories remain insignicant although the point estimates for Canadian acqui-
sitions in the U.S. are quite large for within-industry acquisitions and the subsample of publicly
traded rms.
Comparison with Post-Adjustment Period An alternative control group to EU transactions
is post-1998 M&A activity in North America itself. The theoretical background discussed in section
2 suggests that the increase in M&As after CUSFTA should be a one-o¤ phenomenon. That is,
once ratication by the Canadian parliament was certain, the full schedule of tari¤ reductions was
known. One might thus expect a relatively fast reallocation of assets from import-competing rms
to exporters and a subsequent decline in liberalization-related M&A activity. To investigate this
issue, I divide my post-liberalization period into two subperiods, 1989-1993 and 1994-1998, and also
add a "post-adjustment" period with M&A transactions in 1999-2003. I then estimate the impact
of post-1989 tari¤ cuts for each period. The corresponding specication is:
E(MAitj:) = it = exp(di + dt + 1  d1989  dti + 2  d1994  dti + 3  d1999  dti) (2)
where di are industry xed e¤ects, dt are period-specic intercepts and dti = tari¤1988  tari¤1998
as before.
As the results in table 6 indicate, the impact of CUSFTA on domestic Canadian M&A activity
was indeed strongest in the period 1989-1993. After that, coe¢ cient estimates come down and
become insignicant for 1999-2003.19 Point estimates do remain relatively large, however, and
statistically signicant for the 1994-1998 period. One potential explanation is that acquirers tend to
space acquisitions over time since M&A involves substantial (convex) adjustment costs. Combined
with the fact that over 50% of acquirers made more than one acquisition in 1985-2003, this might
help explain the stretched-out response observed. Secondly, in most sectors tari¤ cuts took place
over the entire period 1989-1998. Since both exporting opportunities and import competition only
increased after tari¤s had actually been cut, M&A incentives might not have been strong enough
before that reduction (this will hold if discount rates for future prots are positive).
Turning to the remaining categories, results are again insignicant for all periods although the
19A simple F-test rejects the hypothesis 1 = 3 at the 2% level. I have also experimented with using 1999-
2003 as my control period in addition to, or in place of, the original 1985-1988 period. While using 1999-2003 as a
control period is problematic for reasons discussed below, results are qualitatively robust to this change (estimates
for 1989-1993 are always statistically signicant at at least the 2% level).
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point estimates for Canadian-U.S. acquisitions are again large. Interestingly, however, the largest
impact is in the period 1999-2003 while point estimates for 1989-1993 are close to zero. Since such
a late impact of CUSFTA seems unlikely, this is further evidence that the liberalization agreement
did not have a major impact on cross-border M&A transactions.
Transaction Value Regressions I now present additional results using total transaction values
instead of counts. As mentioned in section 4, the use of value data su¤ers from substantial problems
with outliers and missing values. On the other hand, count data might unduly give too much weight
to smaller transactions so that looking at results for value data will still be instructive.
I start by re-estimating my baseline equation (1) but replace counts with the aggregate value
of transactions in a given industry and period (pre and post CUSFTA):
E(valueitjdt; di; dpre; dpost) = vit = exp (di + dpre + dpost +   dpost  dti)
Despite the use of value data rather than counts, Poisson is still the preferred estimation method
(Wooldridge, 2002). This is since Poisson can accomodate zero values of the dependent variable
while only requiring the conditional mean to be correctly specied for consistent estimation.20
Columns 1-4 of table 7 present results for the "raw" value data, i.e. without deletion of outliers
nor imputation of any of the 55% of missing transaction values. For the cross-border categories,
point estimates and signicance levels are quite similar to the baseline specication. The coe¢ cient
estimate for domestic Canadian M&As is about 50% higher than before but this seems to be due
to the overrepresentation of publicly traded companies in the sample used (value data availability
is signicantly better for this subgroup). Indeed, the point estimate in column 1 (18.8) is not far
from the estimate for the subsample of publicly traded rms (15.5, see table 5). The one signicant
di¤erence to the baseline count specication is found for domestic U.S. M&A activity where the
point estimate drops to -17.3 and is now highly statistically signicant. However, this change can
be traced to the presence of only three to four massive outliers, representing less than 0.02% of
all U.S. transactions. Once these deals are dropped (in particular the $20 billion acquisition of
RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts in 1988), the coe¢ cient estimate again becomes
20Results for Tobit regressions - which also address the issue of frequent zeros on the left-hand side - yielded quali-
tatively similar results (point estimates were around 50% larger in absolute terms but signicance levels comparable
to the Poisson results). I prefer the Poisson estimates reported below since consistency of Tobit relies on normality
of the underlying latent variable and is likely to be a¤ected by the inclusion of my industry xed e¤ects (Wooldridge,
2002; also see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, on additional advantages of Poisson estimation in a similar setting).
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insignicantly di¤erent from zero.
To control more generally for the presence of outliers, columns 5-8 exclude all transactions with
values bigger than 75 times the median value in a given industry. Furthermore, I impute missing
transaction values at the industry mean to alleviate problems arising from missing data.21 As
seen, this brings results much closer in line with the original baseline specication, in particular for
domestic U.S. M&As.
Finally, I also replicate my analysis of the post-adjustment period 1999-2003 using transaction
values. That is, I estimate specication (2) replacing counts with total transaction values per
industry and period. As the results in table 7b indicate, the picture is again similar to the use of
count data. If anything, the impact of CUSFTA domestic Canadian M&A activity seems to decline
even more rapidly than before. Estimates for the remaining categories are again insignicant and
the coe¢ cient estimates are broadly in line with the count data results.
Alternative Explanations for the Increase in Domestic Canadian M&A? I conclude
my robustness checks by briey discussing two alternative explanations for the strong increase in
domestic Canadian M&A activity.
First, there might have been a relaxation in Canadian competition policy which was correlated
with Canadian tari¤ reductions (e.g. because competition authorities took these reductions into
account in their denition of the relevant market). Since the number of blocked acquisitions in
Canada is very small compared to the number of completed transactions, however, this is unlikely
to a quantitatively important factor. Also, while the stance of competition policy might in theory
deter M&As without actually blocking many deals, documents and statements published by the
Canadian Competition Bureau do not give any indication of signicant post-CUSFTA changes.22
Third, if a looser competition policy was responsible for the surge in Canadian M&A activity one
would expect to see a far stronger e¤ect for within-industry transactions which is not the case.
Finally, even if CUSFTA had led to a substantial change in competition policy, this would not
neccessarily be incompatible with M&As as a means of resource transfer: the need for industrial
restructuring after CUSFTA could have been the underlying cause for increased M&A activity and
a more lenient stance from the competition authorities may have merely facilitated the adjustment.
21The 75median rule drops around 0.5% of all transactions. This particular threshold was chosen since results
are broadly stable to the exclusion of further outliers beyond this point. Imputing values at the median rather than
the mean also does not change any of the ndings.
22See http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/ and in particular the revised Merger Enforcement Guidelines from
1991.
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Another potential explanation for the surge in domestic Canadian M&A activity are sell-o¤s by
U.S. multinationals of their local a¢ liates in Canada. This is again related to the tari¤-jumping
argument outlined earlier. With lower Canadian tari¤ barriers, the incentives for U.S. rms to
maintain production capacity in Canada are reduced. Since their a¢ liates in Canada would be
listed as Canadian rms in Thomson, a sell-o¤ of these a¢ liates to other Canadian rms would
show up as domestic Canadian M&A activity. Again, however, this explanation is unlikely to be
quantitatively important. This can be directly veried in my data given that Thomson provides the
nationality of a targets ultimate parent. Indeed, only about 7% of Canadian targets have ultimate
parents in the U.S., i.e. are a¢ liates of U.S. based multinationals. Excluding these targets from
the analysis leaves my results unchanged.
6 Comparison of Acquirers and Targets
The last sections have provided evidence that CUSFTA led to an increase in M&A activity, in
particular in Canada and both within and between industries. This section looks in more detail
at the characteristics of acquirers and targets in order to determine whether the resulting inter-
rm transfer of resources is similar in nature to the one involved in rm and establishment exit
and contraction. The existing literature has shown that it is usually the less productive rms and
plants that contract or exit. While it is typically not possible to track the employment of factors
of production in these studies, the parallel expansion of high productivity establishments seems
to indicate that they re-employ at least part of the freed-up resources. The question thus arises
whether M&As similarly lead to a channeling of resources towards more productive owners. This
also has important implications for M&A-induced changes in aggregate productivity since existing
studies have demonstrated that post-takeover gains in the targets productivity depend crucially
on a superior e¢ ciency of the acquiring rm (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001).
A simple way of comparing targets and acquirers is to regress proxies for rm size and perfor-
mance on dummies for whether a company is a target or an acquirer in a transaction. For this, I
use data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global as described in section 4. I start
by looking at net sales to get an impression of the size di¤erence between targets and acquirers.
Next, I analyse performance di¤erences by looking at levels of protability, returns to shareholders
and total factor productivity (see Appendix B.2 for details on the construction of these variables).
The basic econometric specication I estimate is:
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ytj = + dt + 1  targettj + "tj (3)
where ytj is the size or performance indicator of interest for company j at time t (where t denotes
the last completed scal year prior to the takeover announcement). The dt represent time xed
e¤ects and targettj is a dummy that takes the value one if the company in question is a target.23
The coe¢ cient of interest is thus 1 which gives the mean di¤erence between targets and acquirers
(which are the omitted category).
Block 1 of table 8 shows results for these baseline regressions. Acquirers are found to be
signicantly bigger in terms of net sales (column 1). In addition, they show signicantly lower levels
of pretax income and returns to shareholders (columns 2 and 3). Interestingly, using estimates of
, dt and 1 for these specications, one nds for most years of the sample that targets were on
average making losses prior to takeover. This is consistent with ndings by Baggs and Brander
(2006) who show that CUSFTA reduced prots for import competing Canadian rms but raised
prots for exporters. Finally, acquirers are estimated to be 4.3% more productive than targets,
with this di¤erence again being highly statistically signicant.
My baseline estimate of 1 is an average across all four M&A categories, i.e. U.S. and Canadian
domestic transactions and the two cross-border categories. Next, I allow for acquirer-target di¤er-
ences to vary across these groups by estimating separate intercepts and slopes for all four types of
M&A transactions:
ytj = CAT + dt + 1  tarUUtj + 2  tarCCtj + 3  tarUCtj + 4  tarCUtj + "tj (4)
where CAT are the category specic intercepts and tarUUtj , tarCCtj , tarUCtj , and tarCUtj are
binary variables indicating whether a company is a target in one of the four types of transactions
(for example, tarUCtj equals one if company j is the U.S. target of a Canadian acquirer).
Results on the four target dummy coe¢ cients are shown in block 2 of table 8. Target-acquirer
di¤erences for net sales and pretax income are broadly similar across all categories. Returns to
23Note that specication (3) pools all available data for targets and acquirers rather than calculating a target-
acquirer di¤erence for each merger and estimating the mean di¤erence. This is necessary since for most mergers I
do not have nancial data on both parties. Note that for a given sample of mergers without missing data these two
approaches are identical. Also, while pooling data increases the number of acquirers relative to targets (because data
availability is generally better for larger rms and acquirers tend to be larger), the resulting bias is likely to work
against and not in favor of nding signicant di¤erences. This is since it is the smaller targets that get excluded from
the sample (and since - at least in my sample - smaller size in terms of net sales is associated with lower protability
and productivity).
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shareholders are again lower for acquisition targets, although the di¤erence is much smaller and
not signicant for Canada-by-U.S. acquisitions. Most interesting, however, are the di¤erences
revealed by the productivity estimates. First, di¤erences in total factor productivity seem to be
considerably more pronounced for domestic Canadian and Canada-by-U.S. acquisitions (acquirers
are 14% and 36% more productive, respectively). For domestic U.S. transactions, the productivity
advantage of acquirers is somewhat lower (4.5%) but still highly statistically signicant. In contrast,
the productivity di¤erence for U.S.-by-Canada acquisitions is actually signicantly positive. One
potential explanation might be that there are gains for Canadian rms that go beyond a pure
reallocation story where acquirers improve the target rms productivity (e.g. access to superior
technology in the U.S. market). For all other categories, however, it seems that resources are
transferred from less to more protable and productive rms.
In a last step, I augment specication (4) with industry xed e¤ects to control for possible
variations in company characteristics across sectors. As shown in block 3 of table 8, this does not
change any of the above conclusions.
7 The Quantitative Importance of the M&A Channel
The ndings so far are supportive of the view that CUSFTA triggered an increase in resource
transfers via M&As, especially in the smaller Canadian market. It also seems that these transfers
were in most cases from less to more protable and productive rms, similar to the channels analyzed
in the previous literature (i.e. contraction and closure). A question that naturally arises from these
observations is how important inter-rm resource transfers through M&As are quantitatively, both
in absolute terms and relative to the two other forms of adjustment to freer trade.
While the absence of a control group of rms not engaging in M&As in the Thomson Financial
dataset prevents me from giving a denitive answer to this question, some progress can be made in
a more indirect way. In particular, the available data allow an analysis of how important resource
transfers via M&As are in general, i.e. not necessarily linked to trade liberalization. Against
this baseline, the earlier estimates of CUSFTAs impact on M&A activity can be judged on their
quantitative importance.
To evaluate this quantitative importance, I rely again on information for publicly traded rms
from Compustat North America and Compustat Global as described in section 4. Of the 363
Canadian and 6584 U.S. rms contained in the Compustat sample, about a quarter exits during
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the period 1985-1998 due to M&As or bankruptcy related reasons with M&As accounting for 83%
of all exits (see table 9). That is, M&As seem to be by far the most important exit form for publicly
traded rms in North America.
Table 10 delves deeper by quantifying the average annual amount of jobs and production (net
sales) transferred through the two exit forms. In addition, I also look at the third form of moving
resources away from contracting rms, i.e. decreases in employment and sales at continuing com-
panies. The resulting gures show that while reductions at existing rms are the most important
channel, M&As are responsible for about 25-35% of job transfers and sales volume redeployment.
These gures are similar for both the U.S. and Canada and demonstrate that M&As are indeed a
quantitatively important way of transferring resources between rms. For the publicly traded com-
panies analyzed here, it also far outweighs exit via bankruptcy as the third adjustment channel.24
It is likely that exit by bankruptcy will be more important among smaller, non-publicly traded
companies and that turnover at continuing rms will also be higher for this group (see Davis et
al., 1996). On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that publicly traded rms account
for over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in North America. Thus, the overall quan-
titative importance of M&As is unlikely to decrease by much in a more comprehensive sample.
Combined with the earlier ndings that CUSFTA led to large increases in domestic M&A activity
in Canada (over 70% according to my estimates), these results suggest that the amount of resource
transfer involved was indeed substantial.
8 Conclusions
This paper examined the empirical relevance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a channel of
rm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. In a rst step, I used the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989 to estimate the impact of freer trade on M&A activity. I argued that
CUSFTA provided an ideal setting for this purpose in many ways. It was a liberalization agreement
between industrialized countries with comparatively few restrictions on takeovers; it represented a
source of unanticipated and largely exogenous variation in trade barriers; and its main instrument
- tari¤ reductions - was a direct and easily quantiable trade policy measure with substantial
24These gures are likely to be underestimates of the true extent of resource transfers through both M&A and
bankruptcy/liquidation. For example, sell-o¤s and closures of individual plants will show up under the "reduction
at continuing rms" category (exit through M&As or bankruptcy/liquidation in Compustat only occurs if the entire
rm is acquired or goes bankrupt). See appendix B.2 for details.
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sectoral variation. Implementing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences identication strategy, I found a rich
set of results. While there does not seem to be a robust link between cross-border M&As and trade
liberalization, resource transfer through M&As between domestic rms is an empirically relevant
phenomenon. This is particularly true for Canada, where I estimate a tari¤ cut-related increase
in domestic M&A activity of over 70%. The e¤ect on domestic U.S. transactions is essentially
negligible which is consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented a much less important trade
shock for the large American market.
In order to compare resource transfers through M&As to adjustment via rm- and establishment
contraction and exit, I further presented evidence on the nature and quantitative importance of
the M&A channel. Using a large sample of publicly traded rms, I found that M&As involved a
rechannelling of resources from low to high productivity rms and that the magnitude of the resource
transfer is likely to have been quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggest that
for rms adapting to freer trade, M&As represent an important alternative to adjustment via
closure, contraction, or internal expansion.
There are a number of interesting implications arising from these ndings. In particular, they
highlight the fact that adjustment to freer trade can take less drastic forms than rm and plant
closure and the associated mass layo¤s of workers and liquidation of capital. Indeed, if M&As do
represent a swifter and more e¢ cient way of transferring resources between rms, this would have
important implications for competition policy. In particular, one would like antitrust authorities to
facilitate the necessary transfer of resources by reducing restrictions on acquisitions in the wake of
trade liberalizations. Given the generally higher level of restrictions imposed on M&A activity in
developing countries, this proposition could be of particular relevance there. This line of thought
is reminiscent of certain strands in the Corporate Finance literature (in particular Jensen, 1993)
which argue that takeovers represent a far superior way of restructuring industries than internal
adjustments or bankruptcy and as such should not face unnecessary legal restrictions.25
The ndings presented in this paper suggest a number of important areas for further research.
A particularly promising extension would be to investigate in more detail how M&As compare to
the alternative adjustment channels of exit and internal expansion or contraction. For example,
what rm and industry characterstics determine whether adjustment takes place through M&A
25Some tentative evidence supporting the e¢ ciency of the M&A channel comes from the observation that M&As
seem to lead to overall e¢ ciency gains in most periods and settings (see Andrade et al., 2001, for a detailed survey).
In contrast, liquidation costs are usually found to be substantial, with asset values decreasing by over 50% (see
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004).
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or factor markets? Is it the least protable rms that go bankrupt while slightly more protable
ones are acquired? What happens after takeover and how signicant is the ensuing restructuring
process? Secondly, the complex nature of the results shown here also represent a challenge for future
theoretical work. To my knowledge, no existing theoretical framework is capable of accomodating
all or even most of the salient features of international M&A activity highlighted in this study
(in particular, the di¤erent reactions of domestic vs. cross-border M&A, the importance of both
inter- and intraindustry M&A, the role of asymmetric country size or the dynamic aspects of
M&A activity in response to trade shocks). Modelling these features would be of great help in
improving our understanding of the underlying mechanisms, their welfare implications as well as
their relevance in other settings (e.g. in developing countries).
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A A Simple Model of Trade Liberalization and M&A Activity
This appendix formalizes the key insights of the discussion in section 2. I start with the sim-
plest modelling framework (within-industry adjustment following a trade liberalization between
two symmetric countries). I then move on to discuss the various extensions mentioned in section 2.
A.1 Model Setup and Initial Equilibrium
Following Melitz (2003) and Jovanovic and Rouseau (2002), I analyze a setting with two symmetric
countries in which M&As are used to transfer capital between rms with di¤erent productivity
levels. I start in an initial steady state equilibrium in which rms have already acquired the optimal
capital stocks associated with the prevailing level of trade costs. I then shock this equilibrium by
an unanticipated lowering of trade barriers which triggers a transfer of capital via M&As from
non-exporters to exporters (i.e. from less productive to more productive rms).
In each of the two countries, rms produce di¤erentiated varieties under monopolistic com-
petition. Constant per-period demand in the initial steady state is generated by standard CES
preferences:
u(q) =
Z
" 
q()
 1
 d
 
 1
where   is the set of varieties available (both domestically produced and imported) and q() is
consumption of any given variety. Utility maximization by consumers yields demand (q) and
expenditure levels (r) of any variety  as q() = p() P  1E and r() = p()1 P  1E. In
these expressions, p() is the price of variety ,  > 1 the elasticity of substitution between any
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two varieties and P the CES price index dened as P =
hR
"  p()
1 d
i 1
1 
. Total expenditure
E consists of aggregate prots only which I normalize to one in the following.
Turning to the supply side, I assume for simplicity that varieties are produced using non-
depreciating capital (k) as the only factor of production. Firms are heterogenous in productivity
levels (') and the amount of capital required to produce a given amount of output (q) is given by
k = q' + F . This production function implies a minimum capital stock of F which rms need to
acquire in order to enter the market.
Both economies are endowed with a xed capital stock of K which is owned by rms. Capital
is traded on an M&A market at a price of i=(1   ) where  is the exogenously given and time-
invariant discount factor (and i is thus the amortized per-period cost of acquiring one unit of
capital). Writing the M&A price in this way facilitates the comparison of lifetime revenues and
costs needed below for the rmsoptimization problem. Capital acquired on the M&A market takes
on the acquirers productivity ' after acquisition but I assume that the targets variety cannot be
used.26 Note that it would be straightforward to allow for internal investment or a market for used
capital as additional channels through which rms can adjust their capital stocks. Since none of
the principal ndings would be changed by these extensions, however, I prefer to stick to the more
tractable model outlined here.27
As said, I consider an initial steady state equilibrium in which no rm has an incentive to
exit or enter the market or change its capital stock level. First consider the determination of
the optimal capital stock of active rms in this equilibrium. With every unit of capital rms
hold in addition to F , they can generate per-period revenues of p' but face opportunity costs
of i=(1   ) since they could also o¤er their capital for sale on the M&A market. Since every
rm is a monopolist for its variety, it chooses a price-output combination that maximizes total
discounted prots, given by T (') =
pq
1   

q
' + F

i
1  . The optimal levels of prices and per-
period output are thus p(') =  1
i
' and q(') =
h

 1
i
'
i 
P  1, requiring a capital stock of
kd(') =
h

 1 i
i 
' 1P  1 + F .
In addition to selling domestically, active rms can also export to the foreign market. However,
they incur variable iceberg-type trade cost in doing so, i.e. for every unit they ship only 1=
units arrive while the rest melts during transport. The corresponding export price is thus px(') =

 1
i
' and per-period exports are qx(') =
h

 1
i
'
i 
P  1. In addition to incurring the variable
trade costs measured by  , exporters also have to make a one-time capital investment of Fx in
order to serve the foreign market. Thus, total capital demand for export production is kx(') =h

 1 i
i 
' 1P  1 + Fx. Note that the investment Fx is needed in addition to the domestic
setup capital F and can be thought of as adapting products to foreign standards, establishing local
26The assumption that productivity is owner-specic is standard in the theoretical literature on M&As to assure
the protability of mergers (e.g. Bjornvatn, 2004; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). It is consistent with empirical
observations for the U.S. that plant productivity increases after acquisitions by more productive owners and decreases
if the acquirers plants are less e¢ cient on average (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). On the other hand, ruling out
use of a targets variety eliminates incentives for the most productive rm to take over all remaining rms. This
should be thought of as the limiting case of a model where rms face increasing costs for integrating new products
or varieties into their operations.
27 Internal investment could be introduced, for example, by allowing rms to employ labor from an additional
sector to produce new capital. Distinguishing a market for used capital from the M&A market would be possible
by introducing variable costs for adapting capital for sale. These additional forms of adjustment would put upper
and lower bounds on the M&A price but would not eliminate resource transfers via M&As in reaction to trade
liberalization.
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distribution networks etc. (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997).
Given active rmsoptimal capital stocks, it remains to determine the set of active rms. In
each market, there is a large number (Me) of potential entrants. Firm productivities are initially
drawn at random from a cumulative distribution V (') but all rms acquire knowledge about their
productivity parameter ' before entry, i.e. before acquiring the minimum capital amount F or any
additional capital.28 Thus, only those rms will produce for which the sum of discounted future
operating prots given by pq1    q' i1  is at least equal to the setup costs Fi=(1   ). Similarly,
only rms that can cover the xed exporting cost Fxi=(1   ) through future exporting prots
will enter the export market. These two entry conditions can be used to obtain expressions for
the threshold productivities at which production for the domestic and foreign market becomes
protable (denoted ' and 'x, respectively). Here, however, my interest here is on the resulting
levels of capital demand for domestic and export production (derivations and results on ' and 'x
are available from the author).
Demand for capital for domestic production (kd) comes from all rms with '  ' while rms
with '  'x need additional capital (kx) to produce for the export market. To obtain explicit
solutions for ', 'x, kd, and kx, I choose a specic distributional form for V ('). In line with other
contributions in the heterogeneous rm literature (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005), I let ' be
Pareto-distributed, i.e. with cumulative density V (') = 1  


'
a
, where  > 0, a >    1 > 0,
and '  . With these assumptions, I can determine the market clearing price i=(1  ) and derive
total capital stocks used for exporting and domestic production:
Kd =
Z 1
'='
kd (')Mev (') d' = K
"
1 +  a

Fx
F
 1 a
 1
# 1
(5)
and
Kx =
Z 1
'='x
kx (')Mev (') d' = K
"
1 + a

Fx
F
  1 a
 1
# 1
(6)
where  1 a 1 < 0 since by assumption a >    1 > 0.
A.2 Bilateral Trade Liberalization
Now consider an unanticipated decline in variable trade costs  . Similar to Melitz (2003), I focus
on a comparison of the old and the new steady state equilibrium and in particular on the changes
in capital allocation between the two equilibria. It is clear from (5) and (6) that the amount of
capital used for domestic and export production will be di¤erent in the new equilibrium, with Kx
increasing andKd decreasing. Intuitively, increased presence of foreign exporters will lower revenues
for local rms from production for the domestic market, implying lower returns to a rms existing
capital stock. Consequently, import competing rms o¤er part of their capital stock for sale on the
M&A market and any rm with ' below the new entry threshold ' will use M&As to exit the
market altogether. While trade liberalization thus leads to an increase of supply in M&A capital,
it also increases capital demand for export production. This is since lower costs for accessing the
28 Introducing uncertainty of potential entrants about their future productivity levels combined with an exogenous
probability of rm death as in Melitz (2003) would allow generating continuous entry and exit of rms and steady
state M&A activity (in the sense that entrants with insu¢ cient productivity would want to immediately resell their
assets). However, the basic intuition of trade liberalization leading to a reshu­ ing of resources to more productive
rms can equally well be captured in the simpler model presented here.
32
foreign market imply larger market shares for exporters who in turn demand additional capital.
Better access to foreign markets also lowers the minimum productivity level required for protable
exporting ('x), leading to an increase in the number of exporters.
Since the total capital stock per country is xed at K, the price of capital will adjust such
that any increase in export capital demand is o¤set by an equal decrease in capital demand for
domestic production. Thus, the total amount of reallocation of capital into export production can
be determined by di¤erentiating either of expressions (5) or (6) with respect to  . Opting for (5),
I obtain:
dKd =
aK
[1 + ]2 
d > 0
where I dened  =  a
 
Fx
F
 1 a
 1 > 0 as an overall measure of initial trade costs. The total
amount of capital transfers is simply the absolute value of this derivative, i.e. T = jdKdj. Since a,
K,  and  are all positive, T can be written as:
T =
aK
[1 + ]2 
jd j (7)
That is, the amount of resource transfers via M&As is increasing in the magnitude of trade lib-
eralization (as captured by jd j).29 Also note that capital is channelled from non-exporters to
exporters. Since the presence of xed exporting costs means that only the most productive among
the active rms will export, the transfer of capital is in e¤ect from less to more productive rms.
Finally, note that revenues (r) and per-period prots net of capital costs (that is, (1   )T ) are
increasing functions of productivity ' in this model. This implies that acquiring rms are also
larger (in terms of sales) and more protable than targets.
A.3 Econometric Specication
Before discussing di¤erent extensions to this baseline model, I will briey show how the log-
specication used as a robustness check in section 5.3 can be immediately derived from (7). First
dene proxies for T and jd j in accordance with section 5.2. That is, I use the number of M&A
transactions (MA) as proxy for T . Next, variable trade costs  are of the iceberg-type in the model.
They thus relate to tari¤s tar as  = 1 + tar which implies d = dtar. Accordingly, my measure
for jd j = jdtarj will be the absolute change in tari¤s from the pre-CUSFTA year of 1988 to the
last year of tari¤ cuts (1998). As dtar  0 for all sectors, this absolute change is jdtarj =  dtar =
tari¤1988-tari¤1998 = dt (the measure used in section 5.2). With these choices of proxies, I can write
my specication as:
MA =
aK
[1 + ]2 
dt (8)
Next, rewrite the right-hand side of this equation in exponential form:
29Note that interpreting the whole of T as M&A activity assumes that the export and domestic production unit of
a rm sell or acquire all of their capital through the M&A market. Alternatively, one could assume that exporters
reallocate capital internally from domestic to export production and acquire only the shortfall on the M&A market.
While this assumption considerably complicates the analysis, the principal results on which I will rely for my empirical
analysis will remain unchanged: M&A activity is increasing in jd j, and jd j enters the reallocation volume T
multiplicatively (results available from the author upon request).
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MA = exp(ln a+ lnK + ln

[1 + ]2 
+ ln dt) (9)
Finally, assume that the various components of (9) besides dt are either time or industry invariant
and can thus be captured by time and industry xed e¤ects (di, dpre and dpost as before). This
then yields a conditional mean identical to the log-specication used in section 5.3:
E(MAitjdt; di; dt) = it = exp(di + dpre + dpost +   dpost ln dtit)
A.4 Extensions
The most straightforward extension of the above model is to allow for asymmetric countries. The
only adjustment necessary is the introduction of a freely tradable numeraire good to x the price
of capital and to allow the derivation of closed form solutions (compare, for example, Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2005).
Allowing for cross-sector acquisitions is more intricate since it requires the introduction of at
least one additional sector. The easiest framework here is a two sector model in which rms can
use production capacity in the other sector at their own productivity level ' but rst have to make
an investment I to acquire the necessary sector-specic production know-how (this would be in
addition to F ). If the productivity of an acquirer from the non-liberalizing sector is high enough
to be an exporter in the liberalizing sector, a lowering of trade costs can raise its potential prots
above the threshold I and trigger entry.
Finally, allowing for cross-border acquisitions as well requires formalizing the trade-o¤ between
decreased reservation prices of target rms and better export access to the foreign market. This
is conceptually straightforward in that it only requires comparison of the net present values of
exporting vs. acquisition. The exact predictions, however, can be sensitive to assumptions about
market structure and the functional form of variable and xed trade costs (see Bertrand and
Zitouna, 2006, and Bjornvatn, 2004, for two recent modelling approaches).
B Data Appendix
B.1 Linking Tari¤ and M&A Data
The tari¤data in this paper were provided to me by Keith Head and were constructed as described in
Head and Ries (1999). U.S. tari¤s prior to CUSFTA are taken from Government of Canada (1988),
Canadian tari¤s from Lester and Morehen (1987). These publications provide tari¤s for around
100 industries, roughly corresponding to the 3-digit level of the Canadian industry classication
of 1980 (CAN-SIC80). Tari¤ reductions after 1988 are calculated by determining to which so-
called staging category an industry had been assigned under CUSFTA. The staging category
agreed upon determined the rate by which tari¤ protection was being phased out. Most industries
had their tari¤s reduced in equal parts from 1989 to 1998. A smaller number were placed on a
ve year phase-out and a handful opted for immediate elimination. Note that since the above
publications do not contain data for 1985 and 1986, tari¤s for these years are interpolated from
earlier years in my data. Similar to other studies (e.g. Gu et al., 2003), my interpolated data indicate
that changes in 1985-1988 are small both in absolute terms and compared to the subsequent cuts
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implemented via CUSFTA. In my econometric analysis (sections 5.2 and 5.3), I thus implicitly
set the pre-CUSFTA change in tari¤s equal to zero by interacting the 1988-1998 change with a
post-CUSFTA time dummy. This also avoids problems with the low time variation of the binary
tari¤-reduction measure and the appropriate time structure of the impact of tari¤ cuts in the post-
adjustment analysis (compare section 5.3 and footnote 15). In any case, using my interpolated data
in regressions with absolute tari¤ reductions pre and post CUSFTA yields very similar results to
the ones presented in this paper (point estimates are around 10% bigger in absolute terms with
almost identical signicance levels; for example, the estimated e¤ect of a one percentage point tari¤
cut on Canadian M&A activity in my baseline specication is 12.05% as opposed to 11.06% in the
reported results).
In order to link the tari¤ data to the data on M&A transactions, I assign each M&A deal to a
4-digit category of the 1987 U.S. industry classication (US-SIC87) based on the primary eld of
activity of the target company or division. In order to determine the tari¤ facing that industry, I use
a correspondence between CAN-SIC80 and US-SIC87 provided by Statistics Canada. The mapping
was unique in about 70% of cases in the sense that a U.S.-industry was matched to a single tari¤
rate. For the remaining 30%, I used averages of tari¤s weighted according to the average number
of establishments in the CAN-SIC80 category (this arguably captures the "M&A potential" of an
industry better than e.g. value added or output weights would do: ceteris paribus, a transaction is
more likely to occur in an industry with more establishments; however, using simple averages does
not qualitatively a¤ect my results). Finally, I aggregated the U.S. data up to the 3-digit level (140
industries), again using the number of rms in a 4-digit category as tari¤weights. This aggregation
was done in order to reduce the number of zero-transaction industries (thus mitigating problems
of an excess number of zeros in the xed e¤ects Poisson regressions) and to reect more accurately
the less disaggregated nature of the underlying tari¤ data. Aggregation also reduces the likelihood
of misclassication of M&A transactions into the wrong industries due to di¤erences in primary
and secondary activities (most secondary 4-digit SIC codes fall into the same 3-digit category as a
targets primary activity).
B.2 Compustat Data
Comparison of Targets and Acquirers The exact sources from Compustat North America
used for the calculation of the size and performance measures described in section 4 and 6 are data
items 12 and 117 (net sales), 122 and 170 (pretax income), 29 and 146 (employees), 8 and 141 ("net
property, plants and equipment", used as proxy for net capital stocks), as well as 26, 27 and 199
(stock market prices and dividends used for calculating returns to shareholders). For Compustat
Global, data are contained in items 1 (net sales), 21 (pretax income), 162 (employees), 76 ("net
tangible xed assets", used as proxy for net capital stocks), as well as items prcadj, dvpsxi and
cfacshr from Computstat Global Issues (for returns to shareholders). I use 4-digit sectoral deators
to convert nominal values to 1987 values. I then convert entries in Canadian dollars to US dollars
by using the exchange rate for the base year 1987. Capital stocks are deated using investment
price deators for the U.S. and Canada. This is appropriate since under the accounting principles
used in Compustat, capital stocks are valued at current market prices.
Returns to shareholders for company i in period t are calculated as
rit =

priceit + dividendsit
priceit 1
  1

 100
where prices and dividends are adjusted for share splits. I compute total factor productivity from a
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three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function under the assumption of constant returns to scale
and perfect competition on product and factor markets. The shares for the three factors capital,
labor and intermediate inputs are calculated at the 4-digit level from sectoral manufacturing data
provided by Statistics Canada and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note that since Compustat
does not provide information on intermediate inputs, I assume that their cost share in total ship-
ments (net sales) is the same as in the sectoral data used for the construction of factor shares. This
assumes that intermediate input intensity is not systematically related to target or acquirer status.
Quantitative importance of M&As The data for the evaluation of quantitative importance
of M&As are also from Compustat North America and Compustat Global. For Compustat North
America, the exact sources are data items 12 and 177 (net sales) and 29 and 146 (employees).
Date and reason for deletion are provided in data footnotes AFTNT33-AFTNT35. For Compustat
Global, sales and employee data are contained in items 1 and 162, and reason and date of deletion
in the variables INCO and INCOD.
To compute the amount of employment and output (net sales) transfers in table 7, I proceed
as follows. For companies present in two adjacent periods t and t+1, I compute reductions in sales
and employment at individual rms (set to zero for expanding rms), aggregate these for every year
in the sample and then take the yearly average. Firms present in t but not in t+1 are classied as
"exit by M&A", "exit by bankruptcy (chapter 11)", or "exit by liquidation (chapter 7)" according
to the information provided in Compustat. The total resource transfers via M&A in a given year
t+1 are then simply the sum of employment and sales in period t across all rms exiting via M&A
between the two periods (likewise for exit via bankruptcy/liquidation).
Note that sell-o¤s and closures of individual plants will show up under the "reduction at contin-
uing rms" category since exit through M&As or bankruptcy/liquidation in Compustat only occurs
if the entire rm is acquired or goes bankrupt. Also, companies which are granted bankruptcy pro-
tection (chapter 11) will remain in Compustat if they continue to le public nancial reports. On
the other hand, rms that reemerge from chapter 11 protection after at least 15 months without
nancial reporting will be fully counted as "transfers via bankruptcy/liquidation" (even though
the rm will usually keep a signicant part of its workforce and total sales). Taken together, these
considerations suggest that the gures presented in section 7 are a lower bound for transfers via
M&A and probably for bankruptcy/liquidation as well.
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 C Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Target Industries (1985-1998) 
 
Total No. of Acquisitions 1985-1998 
U.S.-
SIC87   
(2-digit) Industry Name 
(1) U.S. by 
U.S. 
(2) U.S. by 
CAN 
(3) CAN by 
U.S. 
(4) CAN by 
CAN 
(5) 
#Establishments 
(U.S.) 
(6) 
#Establishments 
(Canada) 
(7)  Avg. U.S. 
import tariff in 
1988 
(8)  Avg. Can. 
import tariff in 
1988 
          
          
20 Food and kindred products 1651 54 53 242 21,556 3,449 3.9% 5.9% 
21 Tobacco manufactures 41 1 0 2 114 20 20.7% 14.4% 
22 Textile mill products 422 12 16 43 5,886 758 8.7% 13.5% 
23 Apparel and other textile products 509 9 13 21 23,093 2,604 9.4% 15.8% 
24 Lumber and wood products 305 16 16 99 22,744 3,112 2.2% 4.5% 
25 Furniture and fixtures 357 5 3 41 11,658 1,928 2.2% 10.7% 
26 Paper and allied products 568 38 29 134 6,416 815 3.4% 8.8% 
27 Printing and publishing 2137 74 38 227 63,392 5,421 0.5% 2.0% 
28 Chemicals and allied products 2760 81 72 157 12,004 1,205 3.8% 6.2% 
29 Petroleum and coal products 235 9 9 22 2,124 139 0.7% 0.8% 
30 Rubber and misc. plastics products 901 29 37 67 15,642 1,609 4.5% 8.8% 
31 Leather and leather products 128 1 2 4 2,040 321 7.5% 12.6% 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 430 18 24 48 16,254 1,609 1.8% 3.9% 
33 Primary metal industries 845 22 46 76 6,401 515 3.4% 4.5% 
34 Fabricated metal products 1201 42 41 93 36,429 3,217 2.2% 7.0% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 3122 80 107 209 53,956 4,534 2.6% 5.2% 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 2940 86 99 173 16,922 988 3.5% 6.3% 
37 Transportation equipment 1095 26 43 98 11,287 1,258 0.9% 5.5% 
38 Instruments and related products 2598 32 44 69 11,354 981 4.2% 7.0% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 683 19 18 23 17,035 1,723 3.8% 6.2% 
          
 Total (sum or mean) 22928 654 710 1848 356,307 36,206 4.5% 7.5% 
Notes: Columns 1-4 show the total number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing (SIC 20-39) during 1985-1998. The columns give figures by two-digit industry for four 
different M&A categories: 1) Takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms; 3) takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms; and 4) takeovers of 
Canadian firms by other Canadian firms. Acquirers can have primary activity within or outside manufacturing (see table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). Columns 5 and 6 
display the average number of establishments in 1985-1998 for the U.S. and Canada. Columns 7 and 8 show two-digit average import tariffs levied by the U.S. and Canada on each other’s 
manufacturing products in 1988. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Acquirer Industries (1985-1998) 
 
 
 United States  Canada 
Sector (1) Number 
(2) % of total 
manufacturing 
M&A 
(3) secondary SIC 
in manuf. (%) 
(4) at least one 3-
digit SIC-code in 
common with 
target (%)  (5) Number 
(6) % of total 
manufacturing 
M&A 
(7) secondary 
SIC in manuf. 
(%) 
(8) at least one 3-
digit SIC-code in 
common with 
target (%) 
          
          
Manufacturing firms (SIC 2-3) 14654 62.1% 100.0% 55.1%  1615 63.1% 100.0% 58.9% 
- Same 3-digit industry 7269 30.8% 100.0% 100.0%  867 33.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
- Same 2-digit industry but not same 3-digit industry 2486 10.5% 100.0% 14.1%  297 11.6% 100.0% 16.8% 
- Different 2-digit industries 4899 20.8% 100.0% 9.2%  451 17.6% 100.0% 7.8% 
          
Non-manufacturing firms 4002 17.0% 24.1% 2.8%  549 21.5% 22.6% 2.6% 
- Agriculture, Fishing & Hunting (sic 1) 68 0.3% 57.4% 7.4%  14 0.5% 50.0% 7.1% 
- Mining (sic 10-14) 286 1.2% 29.4% 1.7%  70 2.7% 10.0% 0.0% 
- Construction (sic 15-17) 111 0.5% 31.5% 2.7%  11 0.4% 45.5% 0.0% 
- Transportation, communicat. and utilities (sic 4) 476 2.0% 27.3% 2.1%  71 2.8% 45.1% 0.0% 
- Wholesale trade (sic 50-51) 778 3.3% 29.8% 5.1%  90 3.5% 26.7% 6.7% 
- Retail Trade (sic 52-59) 237 1.0% 16.9% 3.0%  24 0.9% 20.8% 4.2% 
- Finance, insurance, and real estate (sic 60-67) 722 3.1% 5.0% 0.3%  150 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
- Services industry (sic 7/8) 1308 5.5% 28.1% 3.1%  113 4.4% 38.9% 5.3% 
- Government (sic 9) 16 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%  6 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
          
Investors, n.e.c (sic 6799) 4926 20.9% 0.0% 0.0%  394 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
          
Total number of manufacturing M&A 23582 100.0%    2558 100.0%   
          
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show the total number of M&A transactions involving manufacturing targets in the U.S. and Canada with acquirers having their principal activity in the SIC-code listed on 
the left. Columns (2) and (6) express these numbers as % of the total number of manufacturing M&A transaction in the respective country.  Columns (3) and (7) list the fraction of acquirers from a 
given SIC code that have a primary OR secondary three-digit SIC-code in manufacturing. Columns (4) and (8) similarly list the fraction of acquirers that have at least one three-digit manufacturing 
SIC-code (primary or secondary) in common with the target. 
Table 3: Baseline Specification, EU M&A controls (1985-1998) 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
Regressor (1) Can. by Can. 
(2) U.S. 
by Can. 
(3) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(4) Can. 
by U.S. 
(5) Can. 
by Can. 
(6) U.S. 
by Can. 
(7) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(8) Can. 
by U.S. 
dpost 1.087 0.508 0.586 1.691 0.976 0.212 0.591 1.867 
 (5.17)** (1.29) (9.13)** (3.90)** (2.22)** (0.50) (5.20)** (3.51)** 
Δtariff 11.055 9.679 -0.956 -3.282 11.479 9.024 -0.991 -3.207 
 (2.70)** (0.81) (0.60) (0.52) (2.40)** (0.82) (0.56) (0.49) 
EU controls? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean μit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*Δtariff). 
Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The dependent 
variable (μit ) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time period (pre-CUSFTA and post-CUSFTA). The 
regressors include a period dummy for the post-CUSFTA period (dpost ) and the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-1998 (Δtariff), 
interacted with the post-CUSFTA period-dummy. All regressions also include industry fixed effects (di). The excluded category is the pre-
CUSFTA period dummy dpre. Columns 5-8 additionally contain the number of takeovers in the EU in the same industry and time period (see 
text for details). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Different Functional Forms (1985-1998) 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
Regressor (1) Can. by Can. 
(2) U.S. 
by Can. 
(3) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(4) Can. 
by U.S. 
(5) Can. 
by Can. 
(6) U.S. 
by Can. 
(7) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(8) Can. 
by U.S. 
dpost 3.062 0.927 0.523 2.501 1.448 0.354 0.494 1.733 
 (5.39)** (1.42) (3.31)** (1.95)+ (4.64)** (1.22)** (7.70)** (4.91)** 
log(Δtariff) 0.458 0.082 -0.003 0.272     
 (2.95)** (0.51) (0.08) (0.70)     
1(Δtariff>Δ50%)     0.582 0.298 0.139 -0.129 
     (2.18)* (1.15) (1.76)+ (0.36) 
EU controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 276 276 276 276 280 280 280 280 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean μit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*Δ). 
Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The dependent 
variable (μit ) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time period (pre-CUSFTA and post-CUSFTA). The 
regressors include a period-dummy for the post-FTA period (dpost ) and transformations of the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-1998 
(Δtariff), interacted with the post-CUSFTA period dummy: line 2 uses logs of absolute changes, i.e. log(Δtariff), and line 3 uses a binary 
indicator (= 1 if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest tariff cuts). All regressions also include industry fixed effects (di) 
as well as the number of takeovers in the EU in the same industry and time-period (see text for details). The excluded category is the pre-
CUSFTA period dummy dpre. +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
Table 5: Subsamples (1985-1998) 
  Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
 
Regressor (1) Canada by Canada 
(2) U.S. by 
Canada (3) U.S. by U.S. 
(4) Canada by 
U.S. 
dpost 0.796 0.210 0.763 1.722 
 (1.78)+ (0.46) (6.52)** (2.96)** 
Δtariff 13.521 9.103 -1.197 0.262 
1)
 E
xc
lu
d.
 
S
IC
67
99
 
(n
.e
.c
.) 
 (2.50)* (0.78) (0.60) (0.04) 
dpost 1.206 0.160 0.542 2.158 
 (3.08)** (0.43) (4.87)** (4.16)** 
Δtariff 10.559 7.956 0.210 -7.848 
2)
 In
cl
ud
. 
ac
qu
. o
f 
m
in
or
ity
 
in
te
re
st
 
 (2.40)* (0.85) (0.13) (1.29) 
dpost 0.924 -0.815 1.028 1.579 
 (1.92)+ (0.95) (4.62)** (1.74)+ 
Δtariff 11.400 22.233 -0.263 -2.200 
3)
 W
ith
in
-
in
du
st
ry
 
ac
qu
. O
nl
y 
 (2.05)* (0.83) (0.07) (0.17) 
dpost 1.247 -0.030 0.690 1.482 
 (2.63)** (0.06) (5.17)** (2.18)* 
Δtariff 15.483 18.124 -1.347 4.323 
4)
 P
ub
lic
ly
 
tra
de
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
on
ly
 
 (2.60)** (1.24) (0.62) (0.43) 
 EU controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 280 280 280 280 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean 
μit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*Δtariff). See text and table 3 for specification details. Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates 
are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The table displays results for four different subsamples 
of manufacturing targets (see first table column and text for details). The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy 
dpre. +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimates including post-adjustment period (1985-2003) 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
Regressor (1) Can. by Can. (2) U.S. by Canada U.S. by U.S. Canada by U.S. 
d8993 0.872 0.399 0.287 1.394 
 (3.81)** (0.86) (4.21)** (3.00)** 
d9498 1.192 0.551 0.822 1.943 
 (5.02)** (1.14) (11.42)** (4.12)** 
d9903 1.519 0.742 0.673 2.199 
 (5.10)** (1.50) (6.21)** (5.25)** 
Δtariff * d8993 13.404 1.351 1.212 -3.299 
 (2.94)** (0.09) (0.72) (0.46) 
Δtariff * d9498 10.707 16.913 -2.554 -3.645 
 (2.30)* (1.11) (1.40) (0.54) 
Δtariff * d9903 7.368 17.669 -1.991 -9.201 
 (1.32) (1.16) (0.79) (1.43) 
Observations 560 560 560 560 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean μit=exp(di+dt+βt*dt *Δtariff). 
See text for specification details. Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at 
the 3-digit industry level. The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy d8588. +, * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
Table 7a: Value regressions (1985-1998) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Total transaction value 
Regressor (1) Can. by Can. 
(2) U.S. 
by Can. 
(3) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(4) Can. 
by U.S. 
(5) Can. 
by Can. 
(6) U.S. 
by Can. 
(7) U.S. 
by U.S. 
(8) Can. 
by U.S. 
dpost -0.086 0.563 0.308 2.471 0.534 0.186 0.276 1.852 
 (0.27) (0.79) (1.82)+ (1.84)+ (2.53)* (0.44) (3.65)** (3.31)** 
Δtariff * dpost 18.786 6.883 -17.297 -2.340 12.560 6.460 -2.305 -8.305 
 (1.78)+ (0.31) (4.28)** (0.11) (2.62)** (0.59) (1.15) (1.03) 
Drop outliers? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Impute values? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean vit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*Δtariff). 
Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The dependent 
variable (vit ) is the aggregate value of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time-period (pre-CUSFTA and post-
CUSFTA). The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy dpre. See text for specification details. Columns 5-8 drop all transactions 
with values > 75 times the corresponding 2-digit industry median and impute missing values at the 2-digit industry mean. +, * and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7b: Value regressions (1985-2003) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Total transaction value 
Regressor (1) Canada by Canada 
(2) U.S. by 
Canada U.S. by U.S. Canada by U.S. 
d8993 0.413 0.166 -0.028 1.731 
 (1.45) (0.29) (0.33) (2.54)* 
d9498 0.798 0.047 0.556 1.927 
 (3.79)** (0.10) (7.16)** (3.43)** 
d9903 0.936 0.845 0.465 2.061 
 (2.41)* (1.72)+ (4.60)** (4.64)** 
Δtariff * d8993 12.584 -5.867 -1.536 -9.592 
 (2.13)* (0.35) (0.79) (0.96) 
Δtariff * d9498 8.947 18.244 -4.429 -6.855 
 (1.79)+ (1.38) (2.24)* (0.83) 
Δtariff * d9903 4.737 5.528 -2.874 -8.575 
 (0.65) (0.39) (1.16) (1.22) 
Drop Outliers? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Impute values? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean vit= exp(di+ dt 
+βt* dt *Δtariff). Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 3-
digit industry level. The dependent variable (vit ) is the aggregate value of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit 
industry and time-period. The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy d8588. See text for specification 
details. +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
Table 8: Comparison Acquirers – Targets (1985-1998) 
Specifi-
cation Regressors 
(1) Net sales 
(logs) 
(2) Pretax income 
per net sales 
(USD) 
(3) Return to 
shareholders (% 
points) 
(4) TFP (logs) Industry dummies? 
Target dummy -1.657 -0.432 -12.500 -0.043 
 (37.90)** (5.95)** (8.75)** (2.53)* (1) 
R-squared 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.01 
No 
Target CAN by CAN -1.417 -0.256 -13.511 -0.144 
 (10.59)** (2.57)* (2.85)** (2.33)* 
Target U.S. by U.S. -1.657 -0.446 -12.418 -0.045 
 (35.70)** (5.77)** (8.34)** (2.56)* 
Target U.S. by CAN. -1.582 -0.426 -23.605 0.206 
 (7.97)** (2.50)* (2.63)** (2.34)* 
Target CAN by U.S. -2.209 -0.389 -1.587 -0.357 
 (11.10)** (2.43)* (0.16) (3.53)** 
(2) 
R-squared 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.03 
No 
Target CAN by CAN -1.447 -0.286 -12.142 -0.087 
 (11.35)** (2.90)** (2.51)* (2.29)* 
Target U.S. by U.S. -1.676 -0.420 -11.102 -0.030 
 (39.52)** (6.32)** (7.24)** (2.48)* 
Target U.S. by CAN. -1.597 -0.385 -20.350 0.115 
 (8.48)** (2.21)* (2.19)* (1.80)+ 
Target CAN by U.S. -2.33 -0.375 -0.065 -0.131 
 (13.29)** (2.48)* (0.01) (1.69)+ 
(3) 
R-squared 0.31 0.11 0.08 0.52 
Yes 
 Observations 14254 8376 9461 9768  
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions (robust t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry 
level). The dependent variables are the company characteristics listed across the top of columns 1-4. “Return to shareholders” is calculated 
as share price (t) + dividends (t) divided by the share price in t-1 (expressed in percentage points). See appendix A.2 for details on data 
sources and construction. Regressors in specification (1) include a constant and a dummy for whether a company is a target. Specifications 
(2) and (3) include separate intercepts and target dummy terms for all four M&A categories (see text for full specification). The table shows 
coefficient estimates for the four target dummies: “Target CAN by CAN” (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms), 
“Target U.S. by U.S.” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms), “Target U.S. by CAN” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by 
Canadian firms), and “Target CAN by U.S.” (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms). Also included are year fixed effects (all 
specifications) and 3-digit industry fixed effects (specification 3 only). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 
1%-level, respectively. 
 
Table 9: Firm exit via M&A and Bankruptcy 
 Canada United States Total 
Firms active in part or all of 1985-1998 363 6584 6947 
Firms exiting via bankruptcy or M&A (number and % of active firms) 59 16.3% 1802 27.3% 1861 26.8% 
- Bankruptcy/Liquidation (number and % of total exit) 5 8.5% 315 17.5% 320 17.2% 
- M&A (number and % of total exit) 54 91.5% 1487 82.5% 1541 82.8% 
Notes: Table shows numbers of publicly traded manufacturing firms active in all or part of 1985-1998 and total occurrences of exit via M&A 
or bankruptcy among these firms. 
 
 
Table 10: Resource Transfer via Contraction, M&A and Bankruptcy 
Yearly Sample Averages 1985-1998 Canada United States Total 
    
(1) Total employment ('000s) 1051.2 16732.8 17784.0 
(2) Gross job reductions at continuing firms ('000s) 52.7 860.9 913.6 
(3) Job reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation ('000s) 0.5 14.0 14.5 
(4) Job transfers through M&A ('000s) 15.7 333.1 348.8 
(5) Total job transfers ('000s) – sum of (2)-(4) 68.9 1208.0 1276.8 
(6) Total job transfers as % of employment – (5)/(1) 6.6% 7.2% 7.2% 
(7) M&A as % of total job transfers – (4)/(5) 22.8% 27.6% 27.3% 
    
(1) Total output (mill. 1995 USD) 170,721 3,321,319 3,492,040 
(2) Gross output reductions at continuing firms (mill. 1995 USD) 8,457 118,082 126,538 
(3) Output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation (mill. 1995 USD) 93 1,728 1,821 
(4) Output transfers through M&A (mill. 1995 USD) 3,858 63,725 67,583 
(5) Total output transfers (mill. 1995 USD) – sum of (2)-(4) 12,408 183,535 195,942 
(6) Total output transfers as % of output – (5)/(1) 7.3% 5.5% 5.6% 
(7) M&A as % of total output transfers – (4)/(5) 31.1% 34.7% 34.5% 
    
Notes: Table shows the amount of job and output transfers via contraction at continuing firms and via exit by bankruptcy/liquidation 
and M&A in 1985-1998. ''Total employment'' and ''Total output'' are obtained by summing over all firms active in a given year. ''Gross 
job/output reductions at continuing firms'' are the sum over all employment/output reductions at continuing firms as compared to the 
previous year. ''Job/output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation'' and ''Job/output transfers through M&A'' are the sum over the 
last available employment/sales figures for firms exiting the dataset in a given year due to bankruptcy/liquidation or M&A (see text and 
appendix A.2 for details on data sources and construction). 
Figure 1: Aggregate Number of M&A Transactions, 1985-1998 
 
  
Notes: Figures show the number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing, expressed as indices relative to 1988. Acquirers can have primary activities within or outside 
manufacturing (see table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). The four graphs give numbers for four M&A categories: a) U.S. firms taken over by other U.S. firms, b) U.S. firms 
taken over by Canadian firms, c) Canadian firms taken over by other Canadian firms, and d) Canadian firms taken over by U.S. firms. 
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Figure 2: Aggregate Number of M&A Transactions, Most vs. Least Affected Industries 
 
 
Notes: Figures show the number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing, expressed as indices relative to 1988. Acquirers can have primary activities within or outside 
manufacturing (see table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). Each graph shows numbers for two groups of target industries: the 50% of industries with the highest and the 50% 
of industries with the lowest cuts in domestic tariffs from 1988-1998. The four graphs give numbers for four M&A categories: a) U.S. firms taken over by other U.S. firms, b) U.S. firms taken 
over by Canadian firms, c) Canadian firms taken over by other Canadian firms, and d) Canadian firms taken over by U.S. firms. 
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